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Smart Sanctions Revisited
Joy Gordon*
T
argeted sanctions—often referred to as “smart sanctions”—began in large
measure as a response to the UN Security Council sanctions imposed on
Iraq in  and , after its invasion of Kuwait. By  it was clear
that the sanctions on Iraq, initially welcomed by antiwar activists as a peaceful
alternative to military action, were different from any sanctions seen before.
Combined with the destruction from the bombing campaign of the Gulf War,
they were devastating to the Iraq economy and infrastructure, resulting in wide-
spread malnutrition, epidemics of water-borne diseases, and the collapse of
every system necessary to ensure human well-being in a modern society. As the
sanctions seemed to have no end in sight, there was considerable “sanctions fati-
gue” within the United Nations, as well as a growing body of literature that ques-
tioned whether sanctions were effective at obtaining compliance by the target
state, even when there was considerable impact on its economy.
In the wake of these concerns, there were efforts in many venues to design sanc-
tions that would not have the humanitarian impact of broad trade sanctions, and
that would also be more effective by putting direct pressure on individual national
policy-makers. These targeted sanctions included arms embargoes, ﬁnancial sanc-
tions on the assets of individuals and companies, travel restrictions on the leaders
of a sanctioned state, and trade sanctions on particular goods. Many viewed tar-
geted sanctions as an especially promising tool for foreign policy and international
governance, and many still see targeted sanctions as a natural and obvious sol-
ution to a broad array of difﬁcult situations. But there are considerable difﬁculties
with each type of targeted sanction, with regard to implementation, humanitarian
impact, and, in some cases, due process rights. Some of these difﬁculties may be
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resolved as these measures continue to be reﬁned. Others are rooted in fundamen-
tal conﬂicts between competing interests or intractable logistical challenges.
The Problem of Humanitarian Impact
Between World War II and  no one thought much about the humanitarian
impact of economic sanctions. There was little visible humanitarian damage,
because sanctions were never devastating; and they were not devastating because
they were never comprehensive. During the cold war, if the United States sanc-
tioned a country, that country could trade with the Eastern bloc, and vice versa.
Consequently, sanctions were sufﬁciently limited in scope that they raised no con-
cerns for human rights. Nor did the Security Council impose comprehensive
measures, since it was largely paralyzed, also because of the cold war. As a result,
with rare exceptions, there was little concern for the humanitarian impact of sanc-
tions. On the contrary, in the s the Security Council sanctions on South
Africa, accompanied by a broad global movement for divestment, were seen as
a nonviolent but effective component of the struggle against apartheid. To the
extent that they worsened the economic conditions for the black population of
South Africa, this was generally not seen as a critical ethical failing of the sanc-
tions, especially as many black South African leaders supported boycotts and
divestment in solidarity with the antiapartheid movement.
But beginning in  and continuously for the next twelve years, the negative
humanitarian impact of the sanctions on Iraq was steadily reported by UN
agencies, such as UNICEF and the World Health Organization, as well as such
nongovernmental organizations as the International Committee of the Red
Cross. These various bodies documented the continuing nature of the crisis,
including epidemics of cholera and typhoid, widespread malnutrition, the deterio-
ration of the national health care system, severe shortages of electricity, and the
collapse of public and private transportation. While Saddam Hussein was often
blamed, by the mid-s it became clear that the sanctions were also in large
measure responsible for the massive, indiscriminate human damage.
Prior to  the sanctions literature had little to say about humanitarian
impact. For the most part, the scholars and practitioners who looked at sanctions
were interested in their effectiveness, deﬁned as the likelihood that the target state
would comply with the demands made by those imposing the sanctions. Such was
the case with the two editions of Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, a study that
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measured the effectiveness of more than a hundred uses of sanctions in the twen-
tieth century. Other studies considered a reconﬁguration of the measure of effec-
tiveness, with David Baldwin arguing that sanctions should be deemed effective as
long as they created costs that were a factor in the calculus of decision-making by
the target state. Still others looked at the question of how to maintain a coalition
of nations participating in a sanctions regime, as each nation was losing opportu-
nities for trade. There were discussions of the range of possible purposes of sanc-
tions, with Margaret Doxey articulating a broad list, including symbolism and
expression of disapproval, as well as persuading the targeted state to change its
practices.
The Iraq sanctions, however, triggered a considerable backlash, and sanctions
were suddenly viewed in a very different light. UN Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali described economic sanctions as a “blunt instrument” that raises
“the ethical question of whether suffering inﬂicted on vulnerable groups in the
target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders
whose behaviour is unlikely to be affected by the plight of their subjects.” In
, in an address to the UN General Assembly, Cornelio Sommaruga, the pre-
sident of the International Committee of the Red Cross, asked, “Is it not incongru-
ous to impose debilitating sanctions with one hand while with the other bringing
in humanitarian aid to restore supplies vital to the population’s survival?”
By the mid-s there was much more attention paid, on several fronts, to the
humanitarian problems associated with sanctions, and numerous proposals were
made to implement procedures that would limit their human damage. Among
them, in , Boutros-Ghali proposed establishing a mechanism such that
prior to imposing sanctions there would be an assessment of their potential
impact, and they would be monitored to minimize the collateral damage. In
 the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) held a
review of the various sanctions that had been imposed by the Security Council
on the former Yugoslavia. The OSCE roundtable “gave considerable attention
to the need to reduce the negative humanitarian effect of sanctions on the civilian
population,” and proposed that the Council incorporate measures that would
allow humanitarian goods to reach civilians.
UN consultants were retained to review the implementation of Security Council
sanctions and to make recommendations to address their humanitarian impact.
One set of consultants, based at the Watson Institute at Brown University and
at the Kroc Institute at the University of Notre Dame, produced the report
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“Toward More Humane and Effective Sanctions Management: Enhancing the
Capacity of the United Nations System.” Published in October , the report
recommended gauging the humanitarian impact of sanctions through the moni-
toring of public health indicators, such as malnutrition and child mortality; econ-
omic indicators, such as the availability of essential goods; population indicators,
such as refugees; and the effect of sanctions on governance and civil society, via
such indicators as increased crime or political repression. As the academic litera-
ture on sanctions grew, it came to include not only studies by political scientists
but also by public health experts and aid workers who had encountered the issue
of humanitarian damage ﬁrst-hand.
The criticism of the humanitarian impact of sanctions was so extensive that,
after Iraq, there were only two other occasions when the Security Council imposed
broad trade sanctions: on Haiti (–) and the former Yugoslavia (–
). Beginning in the early s the sanctions regimes imposed by the
Security Council, as well as the European Union, were narrower and more
reﬁned, and some of the recommendations for monitoring and preliminary assess-
ments were implemented. In the case of Iraq, for example, there was an extensive
system for monitoring the humanitarian crisis; and the UN Department of
Humanitarian Affairs conducted a preliminary review in February  of the
possible humanitarian effects of imposing a ﬂight ban on Sudan.
It was in this context that the concept of “smart sanctions” was developed.
Comprehensive sanctions, and their indiscriminate impact, were to be replaced
with targeted sanctions, designed to affect only the leadership of the target
country, or to restrict goods used by the leadership to engage in aggression or
human rights violations.
The Smart Sanctions Movement
The process of articulating and reﬁning the various types of targeted sanctions
took place on many levels. George Lopez of the Kroc Institute and David
Cortright of the Fourth Freedom Forum provided singular leadership in the
ﬁeld of targeted sanctions: serving as consultants to the Security Council and to
NGOs, publishing inﬂuential collections in the ﬁeld, working with practitioners,
and arranging conferences and other forums that provided opportunities for scho-
lars from many disciplines to contribute their expertise. In addition, the Watson
Institute’s Targeted Sanctions Project sponsored workshops and conferences,
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conducted studies on ﬁnancial sanctions, worked with many national govern-
ments, and provided advice to the Security Council and other UN bodies.
There were also numerous studies by other researchers and consultants, as well
as workshops to develop better methods of implementation involving academics,
NGOs, government ofﬁcials, and UN representatives. For example, in  the
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conﬂict issued a report articulating
the need for targeted sanctions: “Sanctions should be part of a broader inﬂuence
strategy that puts maximum political and economic pressure as precisely as poss-
ible on the offending parties—preferably regimes or speciﬁc leaders, rather than
whole populations. . . . But even sharper measures are possible. ‘Targeted’ sanc-
tions offer a way to focus the penalty more directly on those most responsible
for the crisis.” Similarly, the Watson Institute and the Council on Foreign
Relations organized roundtable discussions on the feasibility of ﬁnancial
sanctions. The ﬁrst of these, “Banking, Crime, and Economic Sanctions,” was con-
vened in New York in May  and brought together key academics, government
ofﬁcials, UN practitioners, and banking ofﬁcials for an initial discussion of the
feasibility of targeted ﬁnancial sanctions, and a second meeting was held the
following month. In December of the same year there was a symposium on tar-
geted sanctions sponsored by eight nongovernmental organizations, also held in
New York; as well as a London conference sponsored by the Overseas
Development Institute (ODI), which then produced a report titled “Can
Sanctions Be Smarter? The Current Debate.”
In  and  the Swiss government facilitated a series of discussions on
targeted ﬁnancial sanctions, known as the Interlaken Process. It examined the
scope of targeted ﬁnancial sanctions, as well as the legal and administrative struc-
tures for their implementation. The Interlaken Process, in which the banking
industry played a major role, began by looking at the tools for dealing with
money laundering. Using ﬁnancial sanctions in the context of Chapter VII of
the UN Charter presented an additional question: How does the Security
Council devise effective ﬁnancial measures when it will be national governments
that must implement them? The initial concern was whether states would be will-
ing to implement these Security Council measures. The second Interlaken session
followed up by looking at the question of how states could implement them, given
disparities among states in their administrative and legal capacities.
The meetings produced a manual for practitioners and a white paper by the
Watson Institute’s Targeted Financial Sanctions Project. In  and 
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there was also a series of expert seminars and working groups, sponsored by the
German foreign ofﬁce, the UN Secretariat, and the Bonn International Center for
Conversion, known as the Bonn-Berlin Process, that focused on arms embargoes
and sanctions related to travel. They developed model resolutions and made rec-
ommendations regarding arms export policies and the monitoring and enforce-
ment of arms embargoes.
In April  the International Peace Academy sponsored a conference in
New York, entitled “Toward Smarter, More Effective UN Sanctions.” In
November of that year UN Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan, in an address to the
International Rescue Committee, invoked the need for smart sanctions: “If we
want to punish, let us punish the guilty. And if we want to bring about change,
let us target the powerful, not the powerless.” A few months later, during a
visit to the Middle East in February , Secretary of State Colin Powell proposed
the use of smart sanctions in Iraq, which eventually culminated in the develop-
ment of a fairly precise list of prohibited goods and signiﬁcantly reformed the
Iraq sanctions regime. In October  the International Peace Academy held
a policy forum entitled “Targeted Sanctions: New Initiatives,” in conjunction
with a special session of the Security Council regarding sanctions. This in
turn was followed by the Stockholm Process, an initiative of the Swedish
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Uppsala University. It consisted of a series of
meetings over the course of , involving more than a hundred experts, to facili-
tate the use of sanctions that are effective, humane, and targeted. The ﬁndings
were presented to the Security Council in February . The Stockholm
Process was followed by the creation of the Special Program on the
Implementation of Targeted Sanctions, which continues to operate today, spon-
sored by Uppsala University.
In addition to these initiatives, the UN began establishing panels of experts to
monitor arms embargoes, conducting extensive ﬁeld visits, and drawing on the
expertise of their members in weapons, illicit trade, and the particular region
involved. These panels are housed in the UN’s Department of Political Affairs,
although they work closely with the Security Council committees established to
monitor the sanctions regimes imposed under Chapter VII. The groups of experts
have made a number of recommendations to reﬁne the language of the Council’s
resolutions, as well as the methods and goals of arms embargoes.
Thus, considerable effort has gone into formulating targeted sanctions that
would be more effective in inﬂuencing the decision-making of political leaders,
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or would more successfully prevent the ﬂow of the goods that are themselves a
source of escalating conﬂict, while avoiding harm to civilian populations or to
third parties. There have been successes in many instances, and signiﬁcant reﬁne-
ment and improvements in implementation.
Revisiting Targeted Sanctions
In , Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull methodically reviewed the various types
of targeted sanctions, looking at the difﬁculties associated with their effectiveness,
implementation, and legality. They attributed some of the problems to lack of
experience in implementation, and to underdevelopment of the political or
administrative systems involved. However, almost a decade later there are still
problems that remain unresolved. Some of these difﬁculties are also found in
the use of broader trade sanctions; others are speciﬁc to targeted sanctions.
With some measures, there are logistical problems with implementation; with
others, even when the measures are implemented, there is little effect on the policy
of the target state; and with some, the targeted measures in fact are overbroad,
triggering the same sort of humanitarian problems for the civilian population
that characterized trade sanctions. In addition, over the last decade, as there has
been greater use of ﬁnancial blacklists against individuals and companies, there
have also emerged questions of due process in their use.
Arms Embargoes
Arms embargoes can seek to block the ﬂow of arms to an entire country, to par-
ticular groups or areas within a country, or to particular individuals or groups,
wherever they are. From the United Nations’ inception until  the Security
Council imposed arms embargoes only twice, against South Africa and
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). In the decade that followed, the Council imposed
arms embargoes a dozen more times.
Arms embargoes seem like an ideal example of a targeted sanction, in that they
are intended to interrupt the ﬂow of precisely those goods that will escalate a
conﬂict or facilitate a human rights abuse. But while there has been considerable
reﬁnement in their use, there continue to be substantial practical problems in
implementation. Most signiﬁcantly, studies have indicated that arms embargoes
actually do little to reduce the ﬂow of weapons. On the contrary, the prohibition
creates a black market for weapons, accompanied by opportunities for higher
proﬁts than in the legal arms trade. There are systematic ways to circumvent
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the prohibitions, such as the use of “ﬂags of convenience” to disguise a ship’s or an
aircraft’s country of origin, the ﬁling of false air routes by cargo planes, and the
forgery of end-user certiﬁcates. There is often collusion of multiple state actors.
For example, in the case of arms trafﬁcking to Liberia, numerous East European
countries exported the illicit arms, while several West African states facilitated ille-
gal shipments.
The sheer quantity of weapons available globally makes it virtually impossible
to suppress the ﬂow of arms anywhere. One commentator on smart sanctions
notes that “the world is literally awash in arms.” Multiple studies have found
that arms embargoes do not signiﬁcantly reduce the ﬂow of arms—they just
make them more expensive; and “the higher the extra cost of weapons, the
more attractive the illegal deals.” There is greater success in restricting the
sale of major weapons systems, since these are more likely to be produced by
state enterprises and be subject to stricter controls. Indeed, in the case of Iraq
the absence of weapons of mass destruction and the overall deterioration of the
Iraqi military were testaments to the success of the sanctions, insofar as their
goal was containment. However, light weapons can more easily be manufactured
and sold by private companies. Embargoes have little effect on their availability,
and light weapons are the ones most commonly used in recent armed conﬂicts.
In addition to the potential proﬁt available from illicit trafﬁcking, the effective-
ness of an arms embargo depends heavily on neighboring countries monitoring
commercial trafﬁc and enforcing the restrictions—often countries that may have
neither the capacity nor the will to do so. In states where illicit arms are manufac-
tured and exported, there needs to be control over private actors, and for this the
state needs an efﬁcient bureaucracy, good border controls, and the consistent
punishment of violators. This is particularly pressing in light of the rise of trans-
national criminal networks and their role in arms sales.
The panels of experts mandated to monitor the arms embargoes often comment
on these issues in their reports. For example, the panel monitoring the embargo
on Côte d’Ivoire noted that for several reasons, “even with extensive presence in
the country, there are difﬁculties in monitoring and enforcement,” pointing out
that some military units would not allow UN forces to conduct inspections.
Many of the letters sent by the panel of experts to the government ministries seek-
ing information were not answered; and this was also the case for their requests
for information sent to a number of other national governments, as well as inter-
national businesses and organizations. The panel of experts for the sanctions
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imposed on North Korea noted in  that more than a hundred member states
had not reported on their implementation of the sanctions as they are required to
do, or had submitted late reports. The panel attributed this to “a lack of resources,
a lack of experience, a lack of awareness, insufﬁcient understanding, different
national priorities, and time-consuming inter-agency procedures.”
The panel of experts for the arms embargo imposed on Liberia observed that
there were numerous ways that arms trafﬁckers were able to avoid detection,
including false ﬂight plans, forged registration documents, and false declarations
on cargo manifests. In addition, they noted that “the borders of Liberia remain
porous and are characterized by multiple informal entry points. The Panel notes
that, as a result, there is great potential for trafﬁcking in arms and ammunition
between Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire.” Similarly, in Somalia the experts observed
that “sea transport has become the choice for the continued violations of the
arms embargo,” given the ease and cost-effectiveness. They reported that there
was also signiﬁcant overland shipment of weapons, across borders and within
the country.
Given the difﬁculties of effectively curtailing the ﬂow of arms, it is not surpris-
ing that arms embargoes rarely result in any actual changes in the behavior of the
target state. A  study by SIPRI, the Swedish research institute on armed conﬂ-
icts, found that in twenty-seven cases involving mandatory arms embargoes, the
behavior of the target state improved only a quarter of the time. Michael
Brzoska gives an even lower ﬁgure: in a study of seventy-four arms embargoes
operating between  and , he ﬁnds that the target state changed its policy
only  percent of the time. (Brzoska, however, considers three types of effective-
ness in the context of arms embargoes: target compliance; reduction of arms ﬂow;
and satisfaction of the sender. While target compliance is quite low, effectiveness
deﬁned by the two other categories is much higher. In  percent of the cases, the
ﬂow of arms is reduced; and in  percent of the cases the sender is satisﬁed with
the outcome, even if the target has not complied. Brzoska uses this reasoning to
argue that arms embargoes should be seen as more effective than mere target com-
pliance would suggest.)
Arms embargoes are sometimes undermined even by allies of the state impos-
ing them. That can be true even if the allies are permanent members of the
Security Council, who themselves voted to impose the embargo. For example,
during the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia, a U.S. company, MPRI, pro-
vided weapons to Bosnia. In the case of Sierra Leone, a British company, Sandline
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International, provided covert shipments of arms to the exiled government, in vio-
lation of the embargo. Indeed, according to a study by SIPRI, in about
two-thirds of the mandatory arms embargoes imposed by the United Nations
from  to  the illicit weapons that arrived in the embargoed areas were
primarily manufactured by the permanent members of the Security Council.
Arms embargoes are also easily circumvented by any country that already has
an industrial base, since other types of manufacturing can be converted to weap-
ons production. This conversion can in fact result in increased income and econ-
omic growth.
Aside from the problems of implementation and effectiveness, arms embargoes
have sometimes raised questions of ethics and equity. An arms embargo that is
applied equally to both sides of a conﬂict can in fact have the effect of putting
one side at a signiﬁcant disadvantage, with the wrongdoer beneﬁting and the vul-
nerable side put in an even worse position. In the case of the former Yugoslavia,
the arms embargo against all the parties to the conﬂict in practice meant, at least
initially, that the Serbian Yugoslav People’s Army held most of Yugoslavia’s weap-
ons and controlled most of its arms industry, while the Croats were put at an
enormous disadvantage. This was a signiﬁcant contributing factor in the genocide
against the Bosnian Muslims. The Security Council has since reﬁned its practice,
permitting arms shipments to regimes it considers legitimate, although the
country as a whole remains under an arms embargo.
Travel Sanctions
There are two common types of travel sanctions: those limiting travel by individ-
uals, such as visa bans, and those involving broader restrictions, such as ﬂight bans
or restrictions on an entire airline.
Visa bans seem to be an ideal targeted measure in that they can designate indi-
vidual political leaders or wrongdoers by name, and the restrictions would affect
them alone. But there are problems with implementation, and doubts whether
those targeted are seriously affected. Often there are no clear procedures providing
guidance for states that encounter banned individuals in their territory or attempt-
ing to enter it. It is not difﬁcult for individuals to hold passports in multiple
nationalities or to use fraudulent passports. But even when the travel of individ-
uals can effectively be restricted, there is little evidence that it is so costly to a pol-
itical or military leader as to cause him to reconsider a policy or state practice, or
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that restricting travel affects such individuals in any way that goes beyond
inconvenience.
Aviation bans target an airline or a nation’s airline industry. In some cases, such
as the sanctions imposed on Libya in response to the Lockerbie bombing, the avia-
tion ban was widely viewed as contributing to a successful outcome. However, there
continue to be difﬁculties with implementation and enforcement of aviation bans;
and, as with any measure that compromises something as fundamental as transpor-
tation, there are signiﬁcant consequences for the civilian population, for neighbor-
ing countries, and for others who are not the intended subject of the sanction.
Even when there are extensive efforts to strengthen them, there are many ways
that ﬂight bans can be circumvented. Planes can be registered under different
names, and the pilots can ﬁle false ﬂight plans. Restrictions on passenger ﬂights
are implemented relatively well, since commercial passenger airlines are generally
well regulated; however, the air cargo industry is not, and thus aviation bans on
cargo ﬂights are quite porous. These illegal ﬂights, in turn, often contribute to
the black market in the sanctioned country. The ﬂight ban imposed on the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was violated con-
tinuously, with tons of goods being ﬂown in daily on illegal but highly proﬁtable
ﬂights, beneﬁting those who could afford to buy black market goods.
There are also humanitarian impacts that are not widely acknowledged. The
lack of regular commercial ﬂights can signiﬁcantly affect the population as a
whole. The ﬂight ban imposed on commercial ﬂights to and from Haiti in 
was seen as a way of denying the wealthy the opportunity to shop for luxuries
abroad, but another consequence was that hundreds of Haitians hoping to receive
asylum in the United States or elsewhere had no way to leave the country. In the
case of the Security Council sanctions on Libya in response to Lockerbie, the avia-
tion ban meant that travel presented a much greater hardship for the population
as a whole; for example, a ﬂight from Tripoli to Alexandria, Egypt, is only ninety
minutes, whereas driving takes ﬁfteen hours.
Restrictions on aviation do more than block ﬂights carrying elites on shopping
trips or cargo ﬂights bringing in luxuries. Aviation is critical to other sectors, such
as agriculture and health care. UN agencies reported that the aviation ban in Libya
compromised the import of agricultural inputs and veterinary supplies, and also
undermined crop dusting, which in turn reduced the availability of food from
both animal sources and agriculture. When the Security Council assessed the
expected humanitarian impact of sanctions on Sudan, UN agencies anticipated
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that an aviation ban would affect medical evacuations and the import of vaccines
that require refrigeration, as well as food availability, since aviation bans were
likely to undermine the import of perishable goods.
In addition to prohibiting ﬂights, aviation bans often also prohibit the sale of parts
or services related to aircraft maintenance. Consequently, even where there are
exemptions—for local travel, crop dusting, or medical evacuations—the secondary
prohibitions can undercut those exemptions. In Libya, domestic air travel was com-
promised by safety issues, since the air travel ban prohibited the sale of parts for
repair and maintenance, and prohibited services, such as engineering or the certiﬁ-
cation of airworthiness. In Afghanistan, the Security Council sanctions froze the
assets of the state-owned airline, depriving it of the funds to purchase spare parts
for repair and maintenance. This measure ignored the fact that air travel is critical
in Afghanistan, since ﬁghting and the consequent damage to roads and bridges
makes overland travel dangerous.
Targeted Trade Sanctions
Targeted trade sanctions seek to interrupt the ﬂow of particular commodities, such
as timber, diamonds, or oil, on the grounds that they beneﬁt political or military lea-
ders responsible for human rights abuses or aggression. In some cases, they are
designed to work in conjunction with other sanction measures. For example, since
Liberia used timber taxes to purchase arms, the Security Council prohibited the
import of Liberian lumber. But to the extent that the export of a particular com-
modity can be undermined, if it is a signiﬁcant part of the target state’s economy,
there can also be the problem of overbreadth that characterized the Iraq sanctions:
that is, compromising a signiﬁcant export may interrupt the cash ﬂow of the leader-
ship, but it may also damage a sector of the economy. As a result, legitimate business
can be affected; and by undermining the state’s source of funding, it can also deprive
the state of the funds needed to perform legitimate governmental functions.
As with the other types of targeted sanctions, there are logistical difﬁculties with
implementation. Commodities are often fungible, and it may be impossible to
identify whether a particular shipment of timber or oil came from the sanctioned
state. Even if there are certiﬁcation procedures, they are often not standardized, or
they lend themselves to forgery. As with arms embargoes, interrupting the ﬂow of
a commodity may simply result in new transport routes to circumvent monitors.
In the case of conﬂict diamonds, some of the critical problems of implemen-
tation—and the problem of overbreadth—were addressed through the Kimberly
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Process, in which the diamond industry worked with importing and exporting
governments and the Security Council to develop a system of certiﬁcates of origin
to ensure that illicit diamonds were effectively blocked from entering the market.
This allowed the diamond industry to avoid blanket measures that would have
affected diamond sales overall. It should be noted, however, that the diamond
industry is a multibillion-dollar concern that was well positioned to lobby at
the highest levels to protect its interests. Most individuals or companies, or for
that matter entire populations, do not have the leverage or the global reach to
develop comparable measures that will protect their interests while allowing for
the enforcement of a trade sanction.
Financial Sanctions
There are three general types of ﬁnancial sanctions: those that blacklist particular
persons or companies; those that blacklist certain categories of persons, such as
senior military ofﬁcers; and blanket measures targeting a state or broad group,
with a “white list” of companies and individuals that are exempt.
It has been difﬁcult to assess the effectiveness of ﬁnancial sanctions in particu-
lar, since they have almost always been imposed in conjunction with other types of
sanctions. However, there are ongoing issues with regard to their effective
implementation, and there are also problems concerning the impact on third par-
ties. Implementation issues are considerable, given that action must be taken
quickly and secretly lest the targeted individual has time to move those assets
beforehand. But, as one commentator notes, it is in the nature of international
sanctions that prompt and secret decisions are unlikely. Implementing ﬁnancial
sanctions also requires an extensive institutional and technological capacity. In the
United States, the Treasury Department’s Ofﬁce of Foreign Assets Control has
such a capacity, but it is unusual in this regard. The burden on banks is also sub-
stantial. One commentator noted that a major New York bank typically processed
, transactions per day, and . million fund transfers per month. Over one
month, the interdiction software might typically tag , transactions as poten-
tially illicit, and all of those would then have to be examined further.
Financial sanctions are implemented more easily in banking than in other areas,
in part because banks are already a highly regulated industry, and because banking
transactions predominantly involve electronic transfers, or electronically recorded
transactions. But outside the banking industry, implementation of ﬁnancial sanc-
tions is much more difﬁcult to coordinate, even where businesses are willing to
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comply. For example, there is “the McDonald’s problem”—that is, if all U.S.
nationals are prohibited from transacting business with al-Qaeda, does that
mean that McDonald’s is expected to refrain from selling a hamburger to anyone
associated with al-Qaeda? If so, what procedures should McDonald’s be expected
to put in place to monitor its transactions, so as to avoid the inadvertent sale of a
Quarter Pounder to a blacklisted terrorist?
Freezing the assets of individuals, companies, and foundations is seen as one of
the most promising forms of targeted sanctions, on many levels. The lists of desig-
nated terrorists or human rights violators embody the sense of precision and the
intuitive sense of fairness that make the idea of targeted sanctions so compelling.
Freezing an individual’s assets also seems far more forceful and damaging than,
say, travel restrictions. However, there are logistical difﬁculties with this measure
as well: a corrupt dictator can hide his assets abroad in the same ways as a criminal
involved in drug trafﬁcking or money laundering. For asset freezes to be
implemented, the leader of a target state must have identiﬁable assets abroad,
and the leader must be more interested in retaining his wealth than in exercising
power. Even when a leader’s assets can be located, asset freezes are most likely to
be effective in limited circumstances: where the target nation is a poor country and
the leader has few other options for acquiring wealth; and where the sender is only
demanding modest changes that do not threaten the regime’s ability to hold
power.
While some ﬁnancial measures were used against South Africa, interrupting the
access of South African enterprises to foreign banks, the ﬁrst targeted ﬁnancial
sanctions in the s were imposed on General Raoul Cedras of Haiti, in
. The ﬁrst blacklists of individuals and companies whose assets were to be fro-
zen were drawn up in , in the sanctions regime imposed on Angola and the
listing of individuals and entities related to UNITA. Initially, the primary issues
with asset freezes concerned logistical problems of implementation. The legiti-
macy of these measures was largely unquestioned in the s, as they were
used in situations where there was little doubt that their targets, such as
Slobodan Milošević, constituted a threat to peace and security. However, the
use of asset freezes increased dramatically after September , , when the
United States added some  names to the lists of those sanctioned under
Security Council Resolution  for their putative involvement with Osama
bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and the Taliban. This marked a shift not only in the quantity
of those targeted but in the criteria for inclusion on the lists. Whereas earlier asset
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freezes had been imposed on persons or entities that had contributed to aggression
or breaches of peace, the lists compiled in regard to terrorism were in many cases
preventive measures—targeting the assets of those with no criminal history who
had not yet committed any wrongful act. Consequently, while the lists of desig-
nated individuals and companies seem quite precise, they have also been
controversial.
As with any other Chapter VII measure, ﬁnancial sanctions are imposed as part
of a political process, without the constitutional safeguards of a criminal prosecu-
tion or the transparency of civil litigation, and the  regime has given rise to
concerns about due process. Some of those listed have brought legal proceedings
against the national governments and the European Community, which
implemented the measure; and in response to the legal actions, the Security
Council has developed some limited forms of recourse. Resolution  itself
provided no means for those listed to challenge their inclusion; neither did it
allow for humanitarian exemptions. Initially, any member could propose names
for the list, and if there was no objection from other member states within
forty-eight hours, the names were added. Further, the proposing government
was not required to provide any information supporting its claims. If a listed indi-
vidual’s government was willing to, it could approach the members of the Security
Council and ask for the individual’s removal from the list; and if the Council
agreed unanimously, then he would be removed. However, if the individual’s gov-
ernment did not want to undertake this diplomatic effort, or if it was unsuccessful,
the listed individual had no further recourse.
The  regime has been widely criticized, and there have been repeated
efforts at reform. In March  the UN’s Ofﬁce of Legal Affairs released a
study concluding that the Council should adopt “fair and clear procedures” for
the blacklists, which would include the right of the individual to be informed of
the measures taken against him; the right to be heard by a body of the Council
within a reasonable time; and the right to seek an effective remedy before an
impartial body. In June  the secretary-general asked the Council to establish
fair and clear procedures for its blacklists, in both its procedures for inclusion and
for “delisting.” In August  the UN special rapporteur on human rights cri-
ticized the lack of due process for those on the sanctions blacklists. Still, it was
not until December of that year that the Security Council established a procedure
to notify those who had been blacklisted and provide them with a brief statement
of the reasons they had been targeted, and established an ofﬁce (the “focal point”)
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to perform the clerical function of receiving and distributing petitions by those
who disputed their inclusion on the blacklist. The focal point offered no advo-
cacy; and neither did it establish an impartial body that could hear evidence and
determine whether blacklisting was appropriate in individual cases.
Criticism of the  regime continued to be widespread, and scathing. By 
more than ﬁfty nations had raised concerns about its arbitrariness and deprivation
of due process rights. In  the International Commission of Jurists issued a
report on counterterrorism measures and human rights, in which it found the
measures of the  regime to be arbitrary, discriminatory, and “unworthy” of
the United Nations. However, the reforms subsequently adopted by the
Security Council continued to fall far short of the rule of law or international stan-
dards for civil rights and due process. In late  the Security Council replaced
the focal point with an ombudsperson who would actually meet with petitioners
and would advocate for them before the committee. This was still a far cry,
though, from an impartial tribunal that could provide an effective remedy in
the event of abuses by the Council.
One of the individuals that the United States added in the aftermath of
September  was a Saudi businessman, Yassin Abdullah Kadi. In December
 he brought an action before the European Court of Justice (ECJ), challenging
the EU’s implementation of Resolution . Although there have been legal
actions before other national and regional judicial bodies, the Kadi case has
been particularly signiﬁcant. In  the ECJ ruled on the case, annulling the
EU’s regulations implementing the Security Council  list on the grounds
that the EU is still bound to observe fundamental human rights, even when imple-
menting Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII. The EU then revised
its procedures, sending Kadi a summary of the reasons for his inclusion on the
list, and inviting him to provide comments or information in response. The EU
dismissed his subsequent response, and continued to maintain a freeze on his
assets. The most recent ruling on the case, issued by the General Court of the
EU in September , found that the EU’s practices still did not provide an
adequate review of Kadi’s claims, and again annulled the regulations implement-
ing Resolution .
Within the procedures available, a number of individuals have been successfully
“delisted,” and the number of those adversely affected by the lists is relatively
small. Nevertheless, these cases have raised important questions about the bound-
aries of the Council’s Chapter VII powers. Whereas the early rulings from the ECJ
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as well as domestic courts held that a member state was unequivocally obligated to
implement a Chapter VII measure without objection or appeal, the later rulings
have begun to suggest that a member state may not have an unequivocal duty
to implement Chapter VII measures automatically; and, further, that the
Council may be limited in its actions in these circumstances by principles of inter-
national law. Of all the types of targeted sanctions, asset freezes may raise the most
serious questions for international law regarding the limits of global governance.
Conclusion
There was considerable optimism in the s about the possibilities of smart
sanctions. Many expected them to provide an elegant and powerful solution to
the failings of broad economic sanctions. They seemed like the perfect ﬁx—
hard-hitting measures, affecting only those responsible for terrorism or inter-
national law violations, and without the ethical and humanitarian problems that
come from crippling an economy. Certainly, enormous efforts have gone into
reﬁning targeted sanctions to improve their effectiveness and to resolve the
human rights problems that have emerged. But while targeted sanctions are
more politically palatable than broad sanctions, they continue to be problematic
on many levels.
Several types of targeted sanctions, such as arms embargoes, have structural
problems with implementation that appear to be irresolvable after almost two dec-
ades of efforts by practitioners, NGOs, and academics. Most types of smart sanc-
tions have not brought about an increase in effectiveness that is dramatically better
than that of “traditional” broad trade sanctions. Some have argued that effective-
ness has to be understood more broadly than just target compliance. As noted ear-
lier, Baldwin maintains that sanctions should be seen as effective if they increase
the costs to the targeted actor or otherwise affect the calculus of decision-making.
Adopting a different approach, Brzoska suggested that, in the case of arms embar-
goes, while target compliance was very low, arms embargoes could be considered
much more successful if we look instead at situations where the sender is satisﬁed
with the outcome, regardless of actual compliance.
There may be merit to Baldwin’s and Brzoska’s strategies for evaluating the
impact of sanctions. However, they do not support the view that, because they
aim at speciﬁc individuals or goods, targeted sanctions are signiﬁcantly more
effective than traditional trade sanctions. These proposals only suggest that if
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we use different criteria, we will view sanctions as more successful than they seem
by the measurement of target compliance. But that is equally true of traditional
sanctions. And, as Drezner notes, however “smart” the sanctions are, their effec-
tiveness is compromised when the senders have different goals. One sender can be
looking for containment, another for regime change; or one sender’s goals can
change as its strategic interests in the region change, without any goal being
accomplished. To the extent that targeted sanctions are imposed to achieve
conﬂicting or ambiguous goals, they will be no more effective than traditional
sanctions.
More disappointingly, targeted sanctions did not bring an end to the
humanitarian damage or the ethical conundrums presented by traditional trade
sanctions—at least not in the manner expected. Arms embargoes that are imposed
against all parties—both aggressors and victims—can cripple the self-defense
efforts of those under attack. Aviation bans can undermine a major component
of a nation’s transportation sector, adversely affecting the civilian population
generally. Financial sanctions targeting the personal assets of individuals—the
form of targeted sanctions that is often seen as the most promising in every
regard—has raised issues of due process that have brought into question the
fundamental nature of the Council’s authority to impose Chapter VII measures.
It may even be that the rhetoric of targeted sanctions has caused, so to speak, a
certain collateral damage: it seems that the trend toward designing—or at least
labeling—economic measures as “targeted” has done much to silence the discus-
sion of the humanitarian impact. Where the s witnessed growing demands
that humanitarian monitoring be incorporated within the sanctions regime, and
for prior assessment of the humanitarian impact, this has largely ceased. It
seems that the common view is that since sanctions are now “smart,” we no longer
have to worry about harming the innocent. But that is clearly not the case.
Sanctions targeting a nation’s ﬁnancial system, or critical industries or exports,
disrupt the economy as a whole, much like traditional trade sanctions.
In the end, targeted sanctions are successful in part; in some ways unsuccessful,
or at least no more successful than traditional sanctions; and in at least one case,
the UN’s targeted list of alleged terrorists, they raise a new set of problems. Thus,
while targeted sanctions have not brought about the kind of catastrophe that
characterized the Iraq sanctions in the early s, they are still fraught with
many of the same difﬁculties and failures that characterized their not-so-smart
predecessors.
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